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INTRODUCTION 
This talk presents some theorems about coherence, rules for consistent 
reasoning in the face of uncertainty. The particular rules incorporated in 
these theorems, and the criteria for consistency which they enforce, arise 
from de Finetti's solution to the most basic problem of inference: how to 
measure uncertainty. de Finetti proposes a measure which reduces the 
assessment of uncertainty to an economic decision. Setting aside technical 
difficulties involving the utility of money, his measure can be defined as 
follows: if you want to express your degree of belief in a proposition, 
you decide upon a number p such that you are neutral between buying and 
selling for $p a ticket which is worth $1 if_ the proposition is true, 
nothing otherwise. When you simultaneously assess the uncertainty of many 
propositions which are related in various ways, you have set the price of 
many such tickets. Is it possible, in principle, that someone could trans-
act with you for some of these, at your prices, in such a way that you must 
pay out more _than you receive from him, no matter which of the propositions 
are true and which false? If so, in your assessments you hav_e in ef feet 
made economic decisions with untoward economic consequence-_;sure loss-
which you should be unwilling to accept. Coherence theorems delineate the 
constraints on your assessments which you must put into ·effect, if you are 
to avoid facing such economic catastrophe--and the inconsistent reasoning 
which it objectifies. 
de Finetti's definition is operati-:,nal, of course, only if at some 
point you will know whether the proposition is true or false. Hence the 
inferential problem to which his uncertainty measure is directly applica-
ble is the prediction of future observables. Consequently,. the theory 
based upon this measure makes prediction the central inferential paradigm, 
displac!ng the more common--if less securely founded--emphasis on the 
estimation and testing of unknown parameters. 
In this talk, the de Finetti measure is adopted, at least as a model 
for thinking about uncertainty. Then, the coherence theorems appropriate 
to a variety of predictive situations, along with the implications for 
economic disaster which they are designed to avoid,are discussed. Section 
1 presents the basic prediction result, due to de Finetti. To avoid sure 
loss, you must assess your uncertainty about a future observation by 
selecting a finitely additive probability measure on the set of possible 
observed values. This result injects the mathematical theory of measure 
into the theory of inference; in contrast, Jeffrey's development starts 
with the unargued assumption that uncertainty measures must conform to the 
usual axioms of probability theory. Of course, the mathematical theory in-
voked by de Finetti's theorem is about finitely- but not necessarily count-
ably-additive measures, which introduces complications for those accustomed 
to Kolmogorov's axiomatization. 
In Section 2, the operational character of de Finetti's uncertainty 
measure is abandoned. Instead, the measure is used to motivate a model for 
the statistical problem of inference about an unknown parameter. The main 
result--due to Heath and Sudderth--is that such inference is coherent if 
and only if it is consistent with the posterior calculated from some fi-
nitely additive prior distribution on the parameter space. The coherence 
criterion used in this setting is weaker 'than sure loss and depends upon 
public agreement that the observation is generated from some distribution 
in the specified parametric family. Basically, this criterion calls for 
the avoidance of a uniformly unfavorable economic horizon, considered over 
all the specified possible mechanisms for generating the observation. 
Section 3 returns to the problem of predictive inference: you are 
going to see two observations in sequence, and you want to know how know-
ledge of the first should shape your prediction of the second. Two theo-
rems are presented. The first relates predictions made with and without 
knowledge of the first observation, and requires that you use a form of 
the law of total probability to avoid sure loss. The second assumes that 
a set 0 of possible joint distributions for the two observations has 
been publicly specified, and concludes that, to avoid uniformly unfavor-
able horizons before either observation is taken, you must agree to predict 
~he second, after having seen the first, in a Bayesian manner, involving 
the selection of a prior probability distribution on 0. 
Section 4 is a mathematical aside, showing how to prove coherence. 
theorems, and Section 5 contains an application of some of the theorems in 
the context of sampling from a finite population. 
The theorems are not stated in their full generality, or with atten-
tion to the strictest mathematical detail--see the original papers for that. 
But one important generalization should be pointed out: it is not neces-
sary to require that every event have its uncertainty measured, as is done 
here--the theorems remain true, but call for the existence of some measure 
which agrees with the partial set of assessments made. For details, see 
de Finetti (1972) and Lane and Sudderth (1981a). 
1. COHERENT ~REDICTION 
You are to make an observation, and you wish first to predict what you 
will observe. How should you express your prediction? . 
·First, you must specify the possible observations: a set X. Next, 
you should distinguish among these possibilities, according to how likely 
you think each is to occur. You can do this, following de Finetti, in this 
way: for each subset S of X, determine a number, p(S), such that you 
would be neutral between buying and selling a ticket which costs $p(S), 
and is worth $1 if S happens, nothing otherwise. 
Some prediction functions have self-contradictory implications. For 
example, suppose a weatherman specifies X = {rain tomorrow, no rain tomor-
row}, and he assesses p(rain tomorrow)= p(no rain tomorrow)= 1/3. If I 
- 2 -
were to take him up on his evaluations, and buy from him a ticket on rain 
and a ticket on no rain, for an outlay $2/3 I would have a pair of tickets 
which together would be worth $1 tomorrow, whether it rained or not. 
This kind of inconsistency is called incoherence. 
More generally, suppose X is any set and p a prediction function 
on X. Make p the basis for a book, and allow a gambler to place a fi-
nite number of bets from this book. That is, the gambler may select n 
subsets of X--say 51 , ••• ,5n--and n real numbers--a1 , ••• ,an. He lays 
out $E~=lai•p(5i), and then, fo~ each i, he collects $ai if Si 
occurs, nothing otherwise. (A negative a reverses the roles of buyer and 
seller between gambler and predictor.) If, for some c > 0, the gambler 
can select sets and stakes in such a way that he wins at least $c, no 
matter what is observed, then the predictor and his prediction function p 
are called incoherent. Otherwise, they are coherent. For a justification 
of this formulation--in particular, of the finiteness of n and the strict 
positivity of c--see de Finetti (1974). 
According to a fundamental result of de Finetti, a prediction function 
p is coherent if and only if it satisfies: 
i) for each subset S of X, 0 < p(5) < 1, 
ii) for each pair of disjoint subsets s1- and 52 of x, 
p(S1 U 52) = p(51) + p(S2). 
According to this result, to solve the problem of prediction, you select a 
finitely additive probability distribution for the future observation. 
This distribution summarizes your opinion--based upon the information 
available to you-about what you expect to observe. You have a lot of 
choice: there are many finitely additive probability measures on X. But 
should you frame any predictive statement which ·is not consistent with at 
least one of these, you in effect open the possibility of a Dutch book 
against yourself. 
2. STATISTICAL COHERENCE 
In the standard statistical set-up, in addition to the set X of 
possible observations, the observer specifies a set 0. Each e in 0 
corresponds to a probability distribution, p8, on X. The interpretation 
is that e specifies a state of information about the process generating 
the forthcoming observation. If the observer possesses the information 
specified by a, he would use p8 as his prediction function for the ob-
seryation. instead, the information available to the observer leads him 
to believe that one element of 0 actually describes the process gener-
ating the observation, but he is uncertain about which element this is. 
The problem of inference in this situation is retrodictive: after observ-
ing x, what should the observer conclude about which 8 in e actually 
describes the process which generated x? 
Superficially, this problem resembles the question considered in the 
previous section. Why not determine, for each subset S of 0, a price 
$p (.S) for a ticket worth $1 if the correct 8 is in e, nothi~g other-
wise--and then decide what properties such a p must have to be coherent? 
Unfortunately, such a program cannot be realized operationally, even con-
ceptually: 8 represents a state of information, not a future observabl~, 
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and so bets on subsets of 0 can never be settled up. This is why 
di Finetti describes the standard statistical formulation as metaphysical; 
it is also at the heart of Geisser's propaganda for predictivism as the 
preferred mode of statistical analysis. 
Nonetheless, Freedman and Purves (1969) have suggested a model for 
statistical inference which involves acting as though 8 were observable. 
For their model, Freedman and Purves invent a scenario with three char-
acters: a master of ceremonies {MC), a bookie (our observer--or inferrer, 
as.he should now be regarded), and a gambler. All three agree upon X 
and 0. The MC arbitrarily selects 8 in 0 and then, using the distri-
bution p8, he generates an observation in X. Before the MC reveals the 
value of his observation, the bookie announces a book on subsets of 0 for 
each x (based upon a prediction function qx), and the gambler, after 
studying these books, decides upon a finite number of bets from each of 
them. The MC then declares the value he observed, say x: so now only one 
of the books, the one based upon q, and a finite number of bets, those 
X 
based upon this book, are relevant. The gambler places these·bets, the MC 
reveals which 8 he used to generate x, and the gambler and bookie 
settle up. 
The set of predictive functions {q :x in X} are the important 
X· 
objects in this scenario: qx represents the inferrer's opinions about 9 
consequent upon the observation of x. What constraints should these func-
tions satisfy? First, the inferrer should not offer a Dutch book, no 
matter what x is observed. By de Finetti's result, this will be satis-
fied if and only if each q is a finitely additive probability measure 
X 
on e. This condition takes no account of the assumed relationship between 
the observation and the set of possible generating mechanisms represented 
by e. 
To see that something more is necessary, consider this example. Both 
1 e and X are the integers, and p8 = 2 (o 8_1 + ~8+1), where ~Y ~s point 
mass at y. If x is observed, ~ must be either x-1 or x+l. As long 
as q ({x-1}) and q ({x+l}) add to unity for some x, the gambler can-
x X . 1 2 
not win for sure. Suppose the bookie decides to make qx = "i°x-l + ~x+l· 
The gambler responds by betting on { (8 ,x): x = 8+1}; that is, if x is 
observed, he will pay ~ for a ticket on {x-1} and will receive $1 
bac~ if 8 is x-1, nothing otherwise. Now with this betting system, the 
gambler achieves an advantage over the bookie: all participants know that 
some 8 has been chosen; for anyone who knows this 8, the expected gain 
for the gambler is 1<~) + ~(-*) = $t; but this expected gain does not 
depend on e. Thus, if the bookie assesses his economic situation before 
x is revealed, from the point of view of any of the possible values for 
1 8, _his horizon is cloudy; he foresees a loss of Si"· No matter what 
rule governs the game, to the-bookie, the game is unfavorable! 
In general, call the bookie and his set of prediction functions 
{q :x in X} coherent if: 
X 
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1) Each q is coherent in the sense of section l; and 
X 
2) there is no betting system available to the gambler, under which 
the expected loss of the bookie, calculated as though e were 
known to have been selected, is greater than $c, for every e 
and some strictly positive c. 
Otherwise, the bookie and his prediction functions are incoherent. To the 
extent that this scenerio is a convincing model for statistical inference, 
an inferrer should behave as a coherent bookie. Refer to the {q :x in X} 
X 
of the inferrer as his set of inferential distributions, and call this set 
coherent if the corresponding Freedman-Purves prediction functions are co-
herent. 
Heath and Sudderth (1978) have characterized coherent inferential dis-
tributions. Suppose each q is a finitely additive probability measure 
on 0. In addition, supposex n is a finitely additive probability measure 
on 0, and for all bounded real-valued functions f on 0 x X, 
JI f(8,x)p 8(dx)n(d8) = f J f(B,x)qx(d8)m(dx) 
for some finitely additive probability measure m on X. 
is called a posterior for the prior n. 
Then {q :x .. in X} 
X 
Theorem (Heath-Sudderth): A set of inferential distributions 
{qx:x in X} is coherent if and only if it is a posterior for some prior n. 
According to this theorem, coherent inference is Bayesian inference: 
select a prior, observe x, and compute the posterior ·on 0 given x. If 
0 and X are both finite, Bayes' formula for computing posteriors by mul-
tiplying likelihood and prior is always available. So the problem of co-
herent inference is completely solved by selecting a prior measure on 0: 
the rest is mechanical application of Bayes' formula. If 8 is infinite, 
it supports finitely additive measures which are not countably additive, 
and complications arise. In particular, there are finitely additive priors 
and countably additive likelihoods which yield no posteriors at all. More-
over, there is not necessarily a simple algorithm like Bayes' formula for 
computing the posterior from a finitely additive prior, even if it does 
exist. There are in general many posteriors for a given prior. Despite 
all this, the theorem is a useful one. If, after all, the inferrer wishes 
to be coherent, the theorem gives him a necessary and sufficient condition 
for being so, and he only needs to work out the mathematics to verify that 
his favorite set of inferential distributions can in fac~ be obtained as 
the posterior for some finitely additive prior. Here is an example which 
has many statistical applications. Suppose 0 and X are the same 
amenable group,, and the sampling distributions p8 form a translation 
family (see Heath and Sudderth for definitions; as a simple example to keep 
in ~ind, let e = X m R and Pe be N(8,l)). Then the formal Bayes pos-
terior with respect to left Haar measure as prior is coherent. But if any 
other relatively invariant prior is used, the resulting invariant posterior 
is incoherent (see Lane and Sudderth (1981c)). 
In standard countably additive Bayesian analysis on infinite parameter 
spaces, improper priors are frequently employed, and Bayes' formula is 
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formally applied to produce a posterior. Improper priors do not meet the 
specifications of the Heath-Sudderth theorem, so the question arises: are 
the posteriors obtained by this recipe coherent? Sometimes yes, sometimes 
no, as the result mentioned in the last paragraph implies. Some general 
results classifying which improper priors lead to coherent formal poste-
riors are discussed in Lane and Sudderth (1981b). Another question involv-
ing improper priors is: do all coherent inferential distributions arise as 
formal posteriors from some--perhaps improper--countably additive prior? 
The answer is no; some examples arise in connection with the marginaliza-
tion paradox (Dawid, Stone, and Zidek (1973)) - see Sudderth (1980). 
3. COHERENT PREDICTIVE INFERENCE 
Consider taking successive observations which are related to each 
other in some way. For example, you might first choose a sample·of size 
ten from some population and then select an additional ite~, or you might 
measure two different physical constants whose actual values are connected 
by some theory. Call the sets of possible values for the first and second 
observations X and Y respectively. For convenience--and hopefully 
without confusion--also refer to the observations themselves, before they 
have been taken, as X and Y. 
How should your predictions about Y be modified by what you actually 
see in the first observation? This is the problem of predictive inference. 
We shall consider two aspects of this problem. First, what relations 
should obtain between your opinions about Y before and after the first 
observation is taken? The second aspect involves the actual mechanism of 
opinion modification. Suppose a set 0 has been specified, whose elements 
characterize the process which jointly generates· the two observations. 
Seeing x on the first observation gives information about which 8 in 9 
provides the correct characterization, and this information is perhaps dif-
ferent for different possible values of X. How should you convert the 
information about 0 you gain from the first observation into a predictive 
distribution for the second? 
To answer the first question, suppose you record all your thoughts 
about the two observations before either is taken. You begin by specifying 
X and Y, and you determine the_following prediction functions, to be 
interpreted as described in Section 1: Px and Py• on X and Y re-
spectively, which express your current opinions about the two observations; 
and for each x in X, the prediction function q on Y, which ex-
x 
pre~ses what your opinions about the second observation will be, should it 
turn out that x is the value of the first one. 
Now, to determine whether these prediction functions are mutually con-
sistent, you are required to convert them into bets and face the economic 
consequences of your opinions. What constitutes an allowable betting sys-
tem for the gambler who uses your books? He should, as always, be re-· 
stricted to a finite number of cash transactions, and he should announce 
all his bets before either observation is taken. The finite number ~f bets 
from the books based upon Px and p? should be paid for be~ore either 
observation is taken, since they represent opinions held at that time. 
What about bets from the books based upon the prediction functions 
{qx:x in X}, representing your opinions after the first observation? 
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Since the bets based upon q will be in force only if x is observed, it 
X 
is most reasonable to have the cash transactions for these bets occur after 
the first observation (if it is x!) but of course before the second. This 
is premised upon the sequential character of the observations, which is 
central in the predictive inference framework. (Contrast this with the 
set-up used by de Finetti when he proves that, if ·A and ~ are events 
depending on the same observation, then p(A n B) = p(B IA)p(A)--here, of 
course, the cash transactions for all three relevant bets are concluded at 
the same time). Thus,-if the gam~ler has chosen to stake $a on a subset 
S of Y using the book derived from qx, he pays you $a·qx(S) if and 
when x is observed, and he collects $a only if the second observation 
is in s. If x is not observed, there is no transaction. Thus, while 
the gambler has announced as part of his betting system a finite number of 
bets from each q - book, he is always restricted to a finite number of 
X . 
cash transactions (and collecti~le bets). 
With these rules, the predictor and his prediction functions are 
coherent if 
1) there is no ·system of bets available to the gambler which guaran-
tees him a win of $c (c > O), no matter which x and y are 
observed; and 
2) for each possible value x of the first observation, there is no 
system of bets on Y available to the gambler which guarantees 
him a win of $c (c > 0), no matter which y is observed. 
So if the predictor is coherent, neither before or after the first observa-
tion will he face a situation in which he owes the gambler a certain sum no 
matter what the future holds. 
By de Finetti's result, all of the predictions--pX' Py, and each qx--
must be finitely additive probability measures on their respective domains. 
They must also fit together as specified by the following theorem due to 
Lane and Sudderth (1981a). 
Theorem: The set of prediction functions described above is coherent 
if and only if: 
1) Px is a finitely additive probability measure on X, 
2) for each x in X, qx is a·finitely additive probability 
measure on Y, and 
3) for each subset S of Y, 
Condition 3) shows that in the predictive framework considered here, the 
law of total probability, like finite additivity, is derivable from the 
criterion of avoiding sure loss. Had the gambler been required to pay for 
all potential transactions (from each q - book) before the first observa-
. -- X . 
tion, condition 3) would be necessary only in case the set X is finite. 
· Not all subjectivists will agree with the formulation adopted here, 
as the following example will perhaps indicate. This example relates to 
the·famous Kolmogorov-Borel paradox involving surface area on spheres, 
which has been discussed from the subjectivist viewpoin~'by de Finetti 
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(1974) and Hill (1979). Here is a statement of the example in the pre-
dictive inferential framework. Someone selects a point on the unit sphere. 
You will first observe its longitude relative to a given polar axis, so X 
is [-n,n]. Next, you will observe its exact positio~, so l is the sur-
face of the sphere. You feel that the point has been selected completely 
"at random", so you evaluate Px and Py as uniform on (the Borels of) X 
and Y respectively. Given the longitude of a point, its position is 
determined by its latitude, so yo~ let qx be the distribution on Y con-
centrated on points with longitude x and latitude uniformly distributed 
on [-w/2,n/2]. (If you do not find these assessments compelling, Hill 
presents reasons why perhaps you should.)' 
Unfortunately, these prediction functi<ms do not satisfy condition 3). 
This has nothing to do with finite additivity, since all' the distributions 
involved are countably additive (on Borels). Rather, the problem hinges on 
what you mean by the assessments conditional on longitude. I contend that 
this should depend on how you intend taking the observations and what you 
want to make inferences about, since the method whereby uncertainty is 
assessed is designed to provide an operational interpretation of a partic-
ular inferential situation. (For example, there is no inconsistency in 
the weatherman introduced in section 1 assessing p(rain) = 1/3, unless 
he also assesses p(no rain)= 1/3.) If you envision taking observations 
and making inferences about them within the sequential scheme outlined 
here, you should regard the "all uniform" assessment, whatever merits some 
of its components might have as assessments in other settings, as jointly 
unacceptable in this one. 
For ~nother aspect of the relation between coherence and the partic-
ular inferential framework in which you make your assessments, suppose you 
choose to regard X and Y as a single observation (X,Y). You can co-
herently predict (X, Y) by specifying any fini·tely additive probability on 
X x Y. Suppose you choose µ. Now you have not been called upon to predict 
Y after X has been observed; this additional task would require addi-
tional selections, namely the set.of prediction functions {q :x in X}. 
X 
It would be nice if your prediction for (X,Y) necessarily also equipped you 
for the coherent sequential prediction of the two observations. This would 
be the case if ~ disintegrates with respect to the product structure on 
Xx Y: that is, if there exist finitely additive measures {q :x in X} on 
X 
Y such that, for each subset A of Xx Y, 
µ {A) = J q (A )px(dx), X X 
where Ax= {y: (x,y) is in A} and Px is the marginal induced by µ on 
X. Unfortunately, this need not be the case: see Dubins (1975). On the 
other hand.,. if you intend making sequential predictions, and have chosen 
coherent prediction functions Px, Py and {qx:x in X}, then you have 
available to you a coherent prediction for the combined observation (X,Y): 
namely, the strategic measure µ on Xx Y determined by the integral. 
displayed above. 
We now turn to the second problem mentioned above. A set 0 is 
specified, whose elements characterize the process which jointly generate 
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X and Y. You believe one of these elements correctly characterizes this 
process, but you are uncertain as to which one it is. If you could deter-
mine that e were correct, you would use Pe as your joint predictive 
distribution for the two observations. The problem is to use information 
about 0 which you have after observing x to decide upon your prediction 
for Y. 
For this problem, only your predictions after the first observation 
are of interest. So you begin by announcing a predictive distribution on 
Y, qx, for each possible value ·x of the first observation. These dis-
tributions are converted ·into books, and the gambler announces a finite 
number of bets from each of them. After the first observation is taken, 
the relevant bets are put into effect; the second observation is then 
taken, and accounts are settled between you and the gambler. 
Before X or Y is observed you can contemplate the gambler's an-
nounced betting system and calculate--for any e in 0--what you would 
expect to lose if e characterized the generating process correctly. 
Suppose you calcualted this number for each 8, and you always obtained a 
figure exceeding $c (c > 0). Then, no matter which characterization 
were accurate, the gambler appears from the point of view of the correct 
8 to hold a fixed advantage over you. If you wish to avoid unfair games 
of this sort, you will make their impossibility a criterion for a coherent 
assignment of predictive distributions. Let us do so. 
Then, the predictor and his prediction functions are, by definition, 
coherent if: 
1) for each x in X, there is no system of bets on Y available 
to the gambler which guarantees him at least $c (c > 0), no 
matter which y is observed. 
2) There is no system of bets on Y available to the gambler which 
gives him expected winnings greater than $c (c > 0), calculated 
according to Pe, for each e in 0. 
To satisfy condition 1), you must be sure that each qx is a finitely 
additive measure on Y. What about condition 2)? Based upon the Heath-
Sudderth theorem, it is reasonable to expect a Bayesian solution to this 
problem; indeed, this is so. The condition--due to Lane and Sudderth 
(1981a)--is as follows: 
Theorem: A set of_prediction functions {q :x in X} 
X 
is coherent if 
and only if 
1) each, qx is a finitely additive probability measure on y and 
2) there exists some finitely additive measure 
the measure m induced on X x Y by ,r and 
n on 0 such that 
{ p e : e in 0} is 
strategic, with conditionals 
set A of Xx Y, 
{q :x in X}. 
X 
That is, for any sub-
m (A) = J p 8 (A) n (de) 
c J q (A )m..(dx), 




A = {y: (x,y) is in A} 
X 
bution on X induced by m. 
and is the marginal distri-
It is interesting to note that there need not be a posterior distri-
bution on 0 given x in order for condition 2) to hold. That is, there 
are situations in which you may choose a prior which allows you to predict 
·the next observation coherently, but does not allow you to "estimate" the 
value of the parameter coherently! An example can be constructed based 
upon the models for sampling from.a finite population introduced in Lane 
and Sudderth (1978). For such an example, 0 would be the set of all 
m n 
real-valued finite populations (i.e., Un=l R ). The first observation 
would be, s~y, the values of four items sample4 from one of these popula-
tions (so· X = R4). Suppose you then put the values of these four items in 
order, creating five intervals on the real line (from -m to the smallest 
value, the smallest value to the next smallest, etc.). Take a fifth item 
from the population. Your second observation tells you which of those five 
intervals this item is in (so Y = {l, 2, 3, 4, 5}, where 1 specifies 
the smallest interval, etc.). Each 8 in 0 specifies the population 
from which the sample is selected, and p8 says that the sample is se-
lected at random without replacement from the population 8. Now there 
exist prior distributions on 0, such that the following assignments would 
give coherent prediction functions: no matter which x is observed (i.e., 
which four items are selected), 
qx{l} = q {2} = ••• = q {5} = 1/5. 
X X · 
There are no posteriors on e for.these distributions, given the values 
of samples of size four selected from the population; nor could you even 
use them to predict coherently the value of the fifth item sampled. This 
example will be amplified in section 5. 
A final note about this coherence theorem: the predictions involved 
are about observables (Y), based only on observed values (x in X). Yet 
whether the predictions are coherent depends upon the specification of the 
set 0. As an example, suppose two successive measurements of the same 
quantity, using the same apparatus, are contemplated. First, suppose 
measurement error is disregarded, so 0 contains only distributions con-
cen~rated on the diagonal of R2 • Then, unless qx is ox' the predic-
tions must be incoherent. Clearly, if e specifies instead independent 
measurements from some nondegenerate translation family, there is a much 
large_r class of coherent prediction functions. 
4. WHY ARE COHERENCE THEOREMS TRUE? 
Suppose A and B are disjoint convex sets in the Euclidean plane, 
and· A has nonempty interior. Then you can always separate A and ~ 
by a line. This fact generalizes: according to the so-called separating 
hyperplane theorem, it is true if the sets are in a general locally convex 
topological vector space. In this setting, the theorem asserts that dis-
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joint convex sets A and B, at least one with nonempty interior, can be 
separated by a hyperplane. Equivalently, there exists a nonzero continuous 
linear functional ,r on the space and a real number r, such that the 
value of n is at least r for each element of A,. and at most r for 
each element of B. The separating hyperplane theorem is an easy conse-
quence of the Hahn-Banach theorem (see Reed and Simon (1972), p. 130), and 
it, in turn, can be used to prove each of the coherence theorems discussed 
above. 
To use the separating hyperplane theorem, it is helpful to rephrase 
its conclusion·in a special case.· Suppose X is a set. Let L(X) con-. 
sist of the bounded real-valued functions on X, and equip L(X) with the 
sup norm. Let A be the uniformly positive functions in L(X): 
A == { f in L (X) : sup f ( x) > 0 } • 
x in X 
Also, let B be a subspace of L(X) (not necessarily closed). Now sup-
pose A and B are disjoint. Since they are both convex, and A has 
nonempty interior (for example, it includes the function with constant 
value 1), the separating hyperplane theorem implies that there is a con-
tinuous linear functional which is at least r on. A and at most r on 
B. Moreover, since the constant function whose value is 0· is a limit point 
of both A and B, the number r must be O. Then, by continuity, the 
functional must assign a nonnegative value to every nonnegative function. 
Each nonnegative linear functional on L(X) corresponds to integration 
with respect to a unique nonzero bounded finitely additive measure on X. 
Let n denote the measure whose integral separates A .and B. Since B 
is symmetric (B = -B), for every f in B, it must be the case that J f dir = O. The following lemma SUIJlS up the results of this paragraph: 
Lemma: X is a set, L(X) th~ space of bounded ..functions on X 
equipped with the sup norm, A the cone of uniformly positive functions 
in L(X), B a subspace of L(X). If A and B are disjoint, there is 
a nonzero bounded finitely additive measure n on X which integrates 
every function in B to zero. 
To illustrate how this lemma applies to coherence, here is a proof 
of the theorem on coherent prediction discussed in·Section 1. X is the 
set of possible observations. B consists of all possible net winnings for 
a gambler usi~g the book based upon the prediction·function p. Thus, B 
is· the finite linear span of functions of the form 
where S is a subset of X. By definition, p is coherent if and only if 
no function in B is uniformly positive: that is, if B is disjoint from 
the.cone of uniformly positive functions in L(X). Thus, if p is coher-
ent, the .above lemma can be applied. This yields a nonzero bounded 
finitely additive measure n on X which integrates.each function in B 
to zero:. in particula~, for each subset S of X, 
- 11 -
o = fgsdn 
= n(S) - p(S)n(X). 
That is, 
p(S) n(S) =--n(X) • 
So p is_a finitely additive probability measure on X. The converse 
result may be obtained directly: if p is not additive, the bookie can be 
exploited just as in the weatherman example of Section 1. 
The first coherence theorem of Section 3 is proved similarly to the 
above. For the second theorem of that section and the Heath-Sudderth re-
sult of Section 2, the relevant coherence condition involves expected win-
nings given a, and so the relevant function space is 1(0). For example, 
here is a sketch of the proof of the Heath-Sudderth result. Suppose the 
gambler chooses a single set in 0 to bet on for each possible x: call 
the chosen set A • Now define the set A on 0 x X by 
X 
A= {(8,x): e is in A}. 
X 
(Of course, any A in 0 x X can be obtained in this fashion). With this 
betting system, the gambler's winnings W are 
His expected winnings f, given e, are 
Let B be the finite linear span of such functions f on e. The coher-
ence criterion implies that, if the assignment {q :x in.X} is coherent, 
X 
B is disjoint from the cone of uniformly positive functions. 
Then, assuming coherence, apply the lemma to get a finitely additive 
probability measure n on 0 whose integral annihilates B. In particu-
lar, for each A in 0 x X, 
JJ1A(e,x)p8(dx)n(d8) = JJJ1A(8,x)qx(d8)p8(dx)n(d8) 
= JJ1A(8,x)qx(d8)m(dx) 
where m is the marginal on X induced by n and {p8:e in 8}. ·Now the 
displayed equality can be extended from indicators to all bounded func-: 
tions on ex X, and it then would show that {qx:x in X} is indeed the 
posterior for the prior n.. The converse is again easy. 
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5. DIFFUSE OPINION AND COHERBNT INFERENCE 
In each of the situations described in Sections 1 through 3, coherence 
required the selection of finitely additive probability measures, either 
as prediction functions on an observation space or as prior distributions 
on a parameter space. Most statisticians are familiar with quite a few 
countably additive distributions, and if opinions are so sharp that they 
can be described by one of these, all is well. However, some opinions are 
too diffuse to be represented by any countably additive distribution. In 
such cases, probability distributions which are not countably additive are 
needed. Unfortunately, few of these are well-known to statisticians. So 
an important task facing the statistician who wants to be coherent is to 
assemble a catalog~e of finitely additive distributions which·give mathe-
matical expression to the kind of diffuse opinions which arise in common 
inferential situations. 
This section describes a class of distributions which can be applied 
to some problems connected with sampling from a finite population. These 
distributions may be used as prior distributions on the values of some nu-
merical characteristic which will be observed for the individuals compris-
ing a sample selected from· the population. The state of. information which 
these distributions are designed to ·express about the population, the 
numerical characteristic, and the way in which the sample is to be chosen, 
has three important components, which were first isolated and described 
by Hill (1968). These are: 
·1) The possibility of precise measurement: the values of the nUJDer-
ical characteristic for any two in9ividuals in the population can 
be distinguished. Thus, no matter how large a sample is selected, 
ties occur with probability zero. 
2) The irrelevance of sample order: if a sample of size n is to 
be selected from the population, A is a subset of Rn, and n 
a permutation of {l, ••• ,n}, then the observed sample values are 
as likely to be in A as in nA. 
3. Diffuse opinion about the distribution of~ characteristic in 
the population: knowledge about this distribution is so limited 
that the predicted rank of the next value sampled does not de-
pend on the values which have already been observed. That is, in 
a sample of size n, the probability that the~ individual 
sampled will have a value between the 1th and (i+l)!! largest of 
the (n-1) values already observed is 1/n, regardless of what 
those (n-1) values were. 
These three properties--especially the third--may not describe any-
one's opinions exactly, yet they may provide a far more satisfying approxi-
mation than any distribution which postulates more knowledge about the 
relation between the scale of measurement for the characteristic and the 
distribution of the characteristic in the population. For example, if you 
are unfamiliar with physics and astronomy, you might think about your 
opinions regarding the population of distances between all pairs of sub-
atomic particles in the universe, before you are to be told the values for 
som~ such distances by a capricious physicist. For a careful justification 
of property 3), (including the notion of a "rubbery" scale of measurement, 
which is not a feature of the particle distance example), see Hill (1968, 
p. 680). 
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There a~e many distributions which incorporate the three properties 
posited above. They are characterized in Lane and Sudderth (1978). Some 
of these distributions describe very vague ideas about the order of magni-
tude of the numbers to be observed: they produce samples all of whose 
values lie outside any given compact set with probability one. On the 
other hand, some of the distributions are highly concentrated: they pro-
duce samples whose values are all arbitrarily close to some fixed value 
with probability one. All the distributions incorporating the three prop-
erties are mixtures of these two types, as the following result shows: if 
a sample of size n is selected, ·using any of these distributions as prior 
on the space of populations, the unconditional probability that the range 
of sample values is between £ and M is zero, for any positive £ 
(however small) and M (however large). 
From an inferential point of view, the most interesting aspect of 
these distributions is that they are not strategic. In particular, it is 
not possible to use these distributions to give coherent predictions for 
the value of the next individual sampled, based on a set of observed 
values. Nor can the values of all the unsampled units be coherently in-. 
£erred. However, it is possible to make coherent predictions about the 
percentage of future observations falling between any two successive ob-· 
served values and to make coherent inferences about some characteristics 
of the percentiles of the popula~ion undergoing sampling. See Hill {1968, 
sections 3 and 4) for details. It is interesting to note that the predic-
tions and inferences which he derives depend on the prior distribution 
only through the mathematical expression of the three properties described 
above, and not on the particular form of the prior itself. 
Finally, it should be noted that diffuse models for random sampling 
from a continuous cumulative distribution function can be constructed 
which are closely related to the diffuse distributions described above. 
Work in progress indicates that these distributions may be used to show 
that predictive distributions based upon the empirical distribution and 
kernel density estimates are incoherent. 
6. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
Buehler (1976) presents an interesting treatment of coherence which 
is not based on de Finetti's uncertainty measure. In addition, his paper 
records several useful separation theorems and its bibliography refers to 
some other important works on coherence. Stone has written many papers 
which relate to coherence ideas; the one most related to this talk is 
listed below. 
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SUMMARY 
Opinions are coherent when they are free from internal inconsisten-
cies. These inconsistencies may be objectified in economic terms, by 
demanding that opinions carry economic consequences. In this framework, 
criteria for coherence appropriate to a variety of predictive and infer-
ential situations are developed, and constraints upon opinions necessary 
and sufficient to meet these criteria are established. The main conclu-
sion is: coherent prediction and.inference require Bayesian methodology. 
Diffuse opinions must be expressed in terms of purely finitely additive 
probability distributions. Some differences between techniques using 
these distributions and those based upon improper countably additive 
distributions are pointed out. Finally, some diffuse models for sampling 
from a finite population are discussed. 
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